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Many voices challenge the values and 
norms of the international order. If the 
United States seeks to maintain a 
relative advantage over its rivals, the 
rules have to be rewritten and the global 
system reshaped. In this sense the 
diagnosis of the Trump administration 
is partially correct – but the instruments 
that President Trump uses are faulty. 
 
In managerial terms, President Trump focuses 
exclusively on transactional leadership, which 
relies on rewards and punishments and is 
therefore closely linked with the coercive 
dimension of power. Such leadership often 
means that goals are set by the leader without 
necessarily including his followers and allies. It 
implies effective control over the means of 
threat and reward by the dominant power. One 
should not overlook the necessity of 
transactional leadership, but it is not sufficient – 
certainly not today, when the US is in relative 
decline. The concept of “power distance”, 
developed by Hofstede (2011), illustrates this 
phenomenon. The greater the asymmetry of 
power between leader and followers, the more 
the leader will simply be able to impose himself, 
thanks to his capabilities, hence the more 
transactional his leadership. On the contrary, if 
the gap keeps shrinking  – and provided that the 
leader wishes to stay at the top of the pyramid – 
the dominant power must increasingly consider 
its followers’ needs and interests and ought to 
share parts of the leadership’s responsibilities 
with them. 
Leadership is about adapting to the context of a 
given situation, therefore – there is no “one size 
fits all”. The US needs to avoid becoming what 
John Gaddis labelled a “system destroyer” 
instead of a “system builder”. The setup of the 
international order requires the legitimation of 
American power by other states. More 
specifically, the latter should recognize the 
authority of the former. 
As it possesses the most material and immaterial 
capabilities (“power to”), the US remains the 
great power with the most means to dominate 
coercively (“power over”). Yet I contend that 
this approach is too limited to understand the 
complexity of power and to guarantee the US 
primacy in world affairs. Indeed when “power 
distance” diminishes, resorting only to “power 
over” is very short-sighted. The more 
Washington sticks to a position of going it 
alone, the more the resistance from allies and 
foes will increase, and create a spill-over effect 
of allies and partners abandoning the US. As 
Foucault detailed in his work: where there is 
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power, there is resistance. If the US does not 
adjust its policy to this reality, resistance will 
become sharper and transform into rebellion 
because of the shift of power relations: the more 
the powerless become empowered, the more the 
powerful weakens (Sadan 2004: 44-45).  
Consequently, if the US wants to stay on top, it 
will need support and cooperation, not only 
from its allies and partners but also from rising 
status quo powers such as Brazil, Indonesia and 
India, and from deviant great powers such as 
China and Russia. As President Theodore 
Roosevelt remarked, “Nine-tenths of wisdom is 
being wise in time”. Accordingly, although 
“power to” and “power over” are indispensable 
characteristics of power, they are not sufficient. 
An additional and necessary characteristic is 
“power with”. 
 
This concept has been developed by Follett1:  “a 
jointly developed power, a co-active, not a 
coercive power” (Thompson 2003: 79). Follett 
was not naive; on the contrary, she was very 
pragmatic and knew that “power with” would 
never replace “power over”, only reduce it. But 
for Follett, to lessen “power over” was about: 
1) Integration: finding a “solution by which 
the desires of both sides were satisfied, 
by integrating the desires of the two 
sides”. She was defending the idea of 
circular behaviour as a basis for 
integration characterized by “interactive 
influence” – A influencing B and B 
influencing A (ibidem: 82 and 83);  
2) Submission to the law of the situation; 
3) Function: “each has his function, 
corresponding to his capabilities, and 
has the authority and the responsibility 
which go with that function” (ibidem: 
85).  
 
Let us analyse in more detail these three central 
ideas of the concept of “power with”. 
 
1. INTEGRATION  
The starting point of Follett’s approach is 
diversity,  and with it the acceptance of conflict: 
every state has its own perceptions, ideology, 
history, identity… “War can never cease until 
we see the value of differences, that they are to 
be maintained not blotted out” (Follett in 
Whipps 2014: 412). Instead of seeing diversity as 
a burden, Follett sees opportunities, and 
possible contributions to change. 
 
Consequently, Follett sees three ways of dealing 
with conflict: domination, compromise, and 
integration (Thompson 2003: 2-3). The first two 
are characterized by a “win-lose” situation, while 
integration is considered as a “win-win” 
situation. Domination is characterized by 
coercion, short termism, often humiliation, 
winner(s) and loser(s), the disappearance of 
diversity, animosity and a desire for revenge 
from the loser(s). As already explained, 
President Trump prefers defeat and conquest: 
“That is, the person with decided fight habits 
feels more at home, happier, in the fight 
movement. Moreover, it leaves the door open 
for further fighting, with the possibility of 
conquest the next time” (ibidem: 18). 
Compromise is characterized by each party 
yielding something. No winners, no losers, but 
frustration and dissatisfaction on both sides: “If 
we get only compromise, the conflict will come 
up again and again in some other form, for in 
compromise we give up part of our desire, and 
because we shall not be content to rest there, 
sometime we shall try to get the whole of our 
desire” (ibidem: 7).  
 
Finally integration is about integrating the 
differences in a new framework that benefits all. 
Integration is the most viable approach in the 
long run. The objective is to avoid “linear 
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behaviour” (passively accepting the order) and 
to promote “circular behaviour” (ibidem: 27). 
Circular behaviour in international relations 
translates into mutual accommodation.  Great 
powers need to be pragmatic and patient, and 
focus on what is doable or achievable in the 
current circumstances, and the US should avoid 
labelling other states as deviant, because the 
final objective is to make this “a functional 
whole or integrative unity” (ibidem: 27). 
Contrary to what one might think, this approach 
is very pragmatic, because goal-oriented. To 
achieve integration means emphasizing respect, 
constructive dialogue and thinking out of the 
box. It’s about the  “art of co-operative 
thinking” (ibidem: 21). 
 
In practice this could be translated into the logic 
of the Bismarck system (“hub and spoke”), 
characterized by co-leadership but with the US 
as systemic leader. Indeed, the Bismarck system 
requires a unique type of leader – the system 
leader, a state which catalyses co-leadership. A 
system leader is a state that acts across 
boundaries and “recognizes that there are actors 
at multiple levels that need to lead change in 
their respective contexts” (Edmunds 2017). 
 
 
Instead of seeing the system from its own 
vantage point and thus have a partial view of the 
system, the system leader is supposed to see the 
larger picture. System thinking is therefore taken 
into consideration; “ the whole picture as a 
living system of inter-woven causality” (ibidem). 
System leadership is only possible if it is based 
on trust, patience, empathy, the other’s 
perspective, communication, and by 
emphasizing common interests (ibidem). It 
should also favour co-creating the future (Sence 
2015). This system would present an 
opportunity to adopt a profile of “initiator”, 
“role model” or “mentor” in a peer-to-peer 
network with equal authority and responsibility 
(Baker 2015), with the objective of guiding and 
facilitating a rapprochement among equals 
within a diverse group, without behaving 
explicitly as a traditional transactional leader – a 
status that would not be granted by the others in 
any case. The art of leadership is about how to 
keep control and while giving control and 
responsibility to others at the same time. 
 
2. LAW OF THE SITUATION  
This second dimension of the “power with” 
approach can only succeed by differentiating 
dispositional attributions from situational 
attributions. Many leaders make a “fundamental 
attribution error”, i.e. a “tendency to 
insufficiently take into account situational forces 
when interpreting the behaviours of others” 
(Brauwer & Bourhis 2006: 610). Follett insisted 
already in the 1920s on the law of the situation 
(Feldheim 2006: 421). Each situation differs 
from the other; flexibility and adaptation is are 
requirements of a leader. No one-size-fits-all 
strategy should be adopted (Foley 2013: 48-49): 
“We cannot study the ‘psychology’ of (States), 
and then the ‘facts’ of the situation, as so often 
seems to be the process of the investigation. We 
must study the (States) in their relation to the 
facts – and then the facts themselves become as 
active as any other part of the ‘total situation.’ 
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We can never understand the total situation 
without taking into account the evolving 
situation. And when a situation changes we have 
not a new variation under the old fact, but a new 
fact” (Thompson 2003).  
 
The US needs to see the world as it is: not 
characterized by solidarism (progressive – Kant) 
but by pluralism (conservative – Grotius), which 
is itself characterized by the “centrality of inter-
state consensus to international order, the 
significance of ethical diversity (or pluralism) 
amongst states, and the fragility of normative 
progress” (Murray 2015: 3). Pluralism focuses 
on “minimalist rules” and “protection of 
national sovereignty” (ibidem). Coexistence 
between states and finding the lowest common 
denominator between them are key to “creat(e) 
a framework for orderly coexistence and 
competition, or possibly also the management of 
collective problems of common fate that 
concern the ‘existence’ part of coexistence” 
(Buzan 2014: 89).  
 
Contrary to solidarism, pluralism is not about 
shared norms, values or institutions: “solidarism 
most commonly manifests itself in a 
commitment to universal human rights of the 
sort associated with landmark international 
declarations, treaties and covenants as the most 
politically prominent and theoretically dominant 
version of […] cosmopolitanism” (Williams 
2015: 106). But an increasing number of 
emerging powers challenge the Western-based 
promotion of liberal values (democracy, human 
rights, …). Even without President Trump, a 
return to the status quo ante would not be 
realistic and would not restore the Western-
dominated rules-based order: “America will 
need to learn new rules and play differently in 
the new balance-of-power world, where others 
have assets and policies the US does not and 
cannot control” (Adams 2018). Indeed, the West 
wrongly assumed that Russia and China would 
adopt the Western rules-based order. In fact, the 
liberal order has been considered a “club of the 
West” and has always been contested, but in a 
very timid way, because of the powerlessness of 
the others, and the asymmetric relationship of 
domination of the West vis-à-vis the rest. This 
asymmetrical relation has evolved in the last two 
decades and is increasingly symmetrical, because 
of the declining influence of and the fragility 
inside Western states on the one hand, and the 
rise of emerging powers and the political and 
economical alternatives they present for other 
states on the other hand (Acharya 2018). 
 
The Western idea that the world could evolve 
towards a Kantian world has to be abandoned. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche rightly 
pointed out that “a state is called the coldest of 
all cold monsters”. Coming back to the 
fundamentals of Realpolitik has become a 
necessity, if a new stable global order is the 
objective. Because this international society is 
based on primary institutions,2 it is also very 
fragile. Consequently, to “push the international 
society in any specific ‘progressive’ direction is a 
dangerous course of action” (Williams 2015: 
105). The emphasis should be on Adam 
Watson’s term “raison de système”: “the idea that it 
pays to make the system work”; this should be 
the main objective (Watson in Buzan 2014: 18).  
By respecting cultural and ideological 
differences, the Bismarck model could bring 
stability and avoid a clash of civilizations or a 
hegemonic war, and guarantee the respect for 
and functioning of the primary institutions. 
 
3. FUNCTIONAL LEADERSHIP  
Finally, states should develop functional 
leadership—“and that should correspond as 
exactly as possible with (its) capacity—and then 
(it) should have the authority and the 
responsibility which go with that function”  
(Thompson 2003: 84-85). Functional leadership  
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is relevant at the regional level, where the US 
should not delegate power (because “power to” 
is not transferable) but empower: “how much 
power they can themselves grow”, “how much 
they will be able to assume” (Thompson 2003: 
87). Rather than delegating power, the objective 
is to delegate authority: authority should go with 
function (Thompson 2003: 191).  
 
As the position of the US erodes, or at least its 
relative power decreases, it also has less 
influence at the regional level. To fill this void, 
the US increasingly has to rely on pivotal states 
(Chas, Hill & Kennedy 1996) to implement its 
grand strategy. These pivotal states will often be 
middle powers. Indeed, by virtue of their 
structural centrality, middle powers are well 
positioned to understand the challenges in the 
international system, due to their relations with 
great powers and their expertise on regional 
issues. Delegating to and sharing regional 
leadership with these pivotal states will be 
essential for the US in its demand to share 
burden, risk and blood. The policy will not be 
effective if leadership is only task-oriented. In 
this regard, a task-oriented leadership would 
decrease efficiency. 
 
The US will have to grant these pivotal states 
some leeway, and take into consideration their 
points of view and demands and involve them in 
discussions regarding grand strategy. It is a triad 
“consisting of leaders and followers joined in a 
common purpose” (Chaleff 2003: 13). In the 
current distribution of power, middle powers 
have the opportunity to advance their political, 
economic and security goals. Classic top-down 
strategies may lead these states to feel 
disengaged from the leader and adopt deviant 
behaviour, even becoming swing states or 
worse, deviants. Followers should therefore be 
part of the strategic process, with responsibility 
in areas such as terrorism, maritime security, 
piracy, etc.:  “Leadership is not defined by the 
exercise of power but by the capacity to increase 
the sense of power among those led. The most 
essential work of the leader is to create more 
leaders” (Avolio & Reichard  2008: 325). By 
giving more autonomy to trusted followers, 
Washington can put in practice a policy of 
selective engagement on the regional 
chessboard. Such a strategy makes sense, since 
regional actors tend to better understand their 
region and its issues. It increases the sense of 
responsibility and fulfils the need for recognition 
of those states to which leadership is delegated 
(prestige-sharing). “Co-management” – the 
sharing of responsibility between the US and 
pivotal states (Berkes 1991: 12) – leads to greater 
interaction, increased collaboration and 
coordination. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This form of American leadership, characterized 
by co-ordinating leadership of varying types and 
varying degrees, although less dominant would 
be more pragmatic, more acceptable to others, 
and far more subtle. The most effective leaders 
will have the least leading to do. Only a US 
grand strategy characterized by maintaining a 
world order structured around the US that gives 
more autonomy and responsibilities to others 
can be successful.  
 
As Arendt explains, “Power corresponds to the 
human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert. Power is never the property of an 
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in 
existence only so long as the group keeps 
together. When we say of somebody that he is 
‘in power’ we actually refer to his being 
empowered by a certain number of people to act 
in their name. The moment the group, from 
which the power originated to begin with 
(potestas in populo, without a people or group 
there is no power), disappears, ‘his power’ also 
vanishes. In current usage, when we speak of a 
‘powerful man’ or a ‘powerful personality’, we 
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already use the word ‘power’ metaphorically; 
what we refer to without metaphor is ‘strength’” 
(Arendt 1970: 44).  
 
If the United States wants to guarantee its 
leadership, it will have to empower others. If 
this does not work, “power over” will again take 
the upper hand, multiplying the risks. But, to 
quote Arendt again: “physical power is not the 
ultimate form of power. Quite the contrary, its 
use represents the failure of social power. Once 
the Sovereign has to draw their sword it is 
because the Leviathan has failed to create social 
power. In a well-functioning Leviathan, this is a 
relatively infrequent occurrence compared with 
routine compliance. However, as observed by 
Arendt, a state that continually uses coercion 
against [other states] is actually relatively weak” 
(Arendt in Haugaard 2003: 107-108). 
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(1) Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933) is known for her writings in the field of management, organisational theory and 
power. Unfortunately, most of her writings, including on management and leadership theory, remain overlooked. Yet 
her contribution on the subject of leadership and power is significant, in particular her analysis of the expected 
behaviour of a leader for a successful business (See K. Thompson (Ed.), The Early Sociology of Management and 
Organizations, Volume III (Dynamic Administration, The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett, Edited by Henry C. 
Metcalf and L. Urwick), Routledge, London & New York, 2003). 
(2) Bull developed five primary institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power 
management (H. Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London, Macmillan, 1977). These 
five are supposed to be the lowest common denominator to organise international society “in that they define not only 
the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, as well as the criteria 
for membership of international society. The classical ‘Westphalian’ set consists of sovereignty, territoriality, the balance 
of power, war, diplomacy, international law and great power management, to which could be added nationalism” 
(Buzan, op.cit.: 17). 
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